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ABSTRACT
The participatory sensing paradigm has interesting appli-
cations, e.g. electrosmog/air-pollution monitoring, carbon
footprint estimation, etc., but raises serious privacy con-
cerns. Existing static privacy-enabling approaches oer no
privacy guarantees, while individual privacy requirements
cannot be met. In this work, we propose an adaptive privacy
protection scheme, in order to meet personalized location-
privacy protection requirements and experimentally prove
its eectiveness against static privacy-protection schemes.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
K.4.1 [Public Policy Issues]: Privacy; C.2.0 [Computer-
Communication Networks]: General|security and pro-
tection
General Terms
Algorithms, Security
Keywords
Location Privacy, Utility, Data Hiding, Location Obfusca-
tion
1. INTRODUCTION
The participatory sensing paradigm enables the vast collec-
tion of sensor data from privately-held sensory devices (e.g.
mobile phones, vehicles, home appliances, etc.), and paves
the ground for innovative applications of great social and
business interest, such as monitoring air pollution and elec-
trosmog, early earthquake detection, etc. However, users
who are sensitive to their private information, such as their
location (and inferred activities), are not expected to be will-
ing to contribute to such systems. Thus, it is necessary to
deploy some privacy-protection mechanisms. The usefulness
of the sensed data for the application though is negatively
aected by the privacy-protection mechanisms.
There exist location privacy-preserving mechanisms [2]
employing techniques such as data hiding or location ob-
fuscation. These techniques have been exploited by the re-
search community for privacy-preserving participatory sens-
ing before, but most of the existing approaches propose
static protection frameworks, such as [1, 5]. Such approaches
have two important problems: (i) They do not dynamically
measure the privacy leakage based on the user actions. How-
ever, spatio-temporal correlation among user actions might
reveal partial or full trajectories. (ii) They have a negative
eect on the utility of the system, because the provided lo-
cation privacy can be much higher in some cases than what
a user actually wants, which can reduce data utility further.
In this work, we propose an innovative approach for con-
tinuous location-privacy protection in participatory sensing
context, where the users estimate locally their expected loca-
tion privacy and compare it with a personal privacy threshold
before taking any privacy-protection action. Our adaptive
scheme is light-weight, realistic and thus easily deployable
on mobile devices. Based on real data traces, we experimen-
tally show that this approach always satises the personal
location-privacy protection requirements, when feasible.
2. ADAPTIVE PRIVACY SCHEME
In participatory sensing, mobile nodes (or just\nodes") sense
their environment (e.g. temperature, speed, noise, etc.) and
send their sensor data < value; location; time > to a certain
data-collection entity called Aggregation Server (AS). In our
work, we consider the application of electrosmog monitoring
by means of participatory sensing. We assume that the mon-
itored area is partitioned into cells, while the time is slot-
ted. The nodes are assumed to be honest, whereas the AS
is semi-honest, meaning that it follows the protocols, does
not collude with other entities and does not tamper with
the system to obtain private information about the nodes.
Additionally, the only background information the AS has
on node mobility is the maximum possible speed.
Our approach to the personalized privacy-protection in
this context is as follows: Nodes should be able to decide on
privacy level requirement and congure privacy-protection
mechanisms accordingly in an adaptive manner. This not
only provides a better protection for nodes, but also de-
creases data utility loss. In light of this, it is important to
enable nodes to locally assess their privacy leakage in real
time: we use the expected distortion (ED) metric, proposed
by Shokri et al. [4], which captures the uncertainty and
the probability of success of the adversarial attack. ED of
location inference for a node u at time t is given by:
ED(u; t) =
X
olt
D(loc(u; t); olt)  Pr(u; olt) (1)
where olt represents the observed locations of node u at time
t. D is a normalized distance function in [0; 1], loc(u; t)
gives the actual location of node u at time t. Pr(u; olt) is
the probability of olt being the actual location of node u.
The result is in the interval [0; 1], where 0 means no privacy
protection and 1 means full privacy protection.
We build a simple, yet eective location-privacy protec-
tion scheme based on the existing privacy-preserving tech-
niques of location obfuscation and hiding. This light-weight
scheme, depicted in Figure 1, works as follows: When a node
has data to submit, it calls the location obfuscation module
with the lowest obfuscation level, i.e. 0. Then, it provides
the output of this module, which is a set of locations, to
the privacy level estimation module. The estimation is com-
pared against the node's privacy threshold . If  is met,
then the node submits the data to the AS. Otherwise, it in-
creases the obfuscation level  and repeats the process. If
the desired privacy level is not reached even if predened
maximum  is reached, then the data is not submitted.
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Figure 1: Adaptive Location-Privacy Protection Mechanism
We calculate the expected privacy leakage locally by main-
taining an event linkability graph at each node. Each vertex
in this graph represents an event observable by the AS. An
observable event corresponds to a data item associated to a
location and a timestamp. The linkability graph is progres-
sively constructed as new events are produced, by connect-
ing events that are consecutive in time. Infeasible events are
removed based on the geographical topology and the maxi-
mum possible speed. Each event in this graph is assigned a
probability of being the node's actual location.
Based on the linkability graph, we use the Bayes rule
to calculate the probability that an observed event corre-
sponds to the actual location of a node. When a node wants
to send data for the rst time, a uniform probability 1=k is
assigned to each corresponding vertex, where k is the num-
ber of vertices. As new vertices are added at a subsequent
time instance, their probabilities to be genuine are calcu-
lated according to the Bayes rule. In case of vertex elimina-
tion due to infeasibility, the probabilities of all the aected
vertices (i.e. parents or siblings) are updated and the up-
date is propagated if necessary. After having calculated the
probability of each observable event to be genuine up to the
current time, a node calculates its expected distortion (ED)
according to Equation (1). The complexity of this process
is O(M2), where M is the number of vertices at a time step.
3. EVALUATION
We evaluate and compare our scheme to static policies ex-
perimentally, using 40 real traces collected during the Lau-
sanne Data Collection Campaign [3] run by Nokia Research
Center (Lausanne) and involving around 200 participants.
We developed the experimental environment in C++ and
the privacy evaluation is done using the Location Privacy
Meter (LPM) by Shokri et al. [4], which is a comprehensive
tool using various metrics including ED.
A static privacy-protection policy dictates a xed hiding
probability and a xed obfuscation level for a node through-
out its data emissions. To this end, we dene two dierent
static policies: (i) Avg Static is the policy which meets  on
the average, and (ii) Max Static meets  most of the time.
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Figure 2: (a) Level of privacy achieved by adaptive vs. static
policies for dierent privacy thresholds. (b) Percentaged absolute
error (dBm) introduced by the various privacy policies.
As shown in Figure 2(a), the \Avg Static" policy vio-
lates  almost half of the time (with 95% condence inter-
val), while the adaptive privacy-protection strategy almost
always meets the privacy threshold requirement. Note that
meeting  = 0:9 is very strict and sometimes infeasible with
the employed location privacy-protection mechanisms. Also,
observe that the adaptive strategy meets the various privacy
thresholds more narrowly, as compared to the \Max Static"
policy. As a result, the adaptive strategy is expected to de-
teriorate the utility of the participatory sensing application
less than any static one, while satisfying the users' privacy
requirements. Indeed, the absolute error as percentage of
the data range introduced by the adaptive strategy is lower
than the respective ones of the two static policies as shown
in Figure 2(b). Also, Figure 2(b) clearly demonstrates the
trade-o between utility and privacy. In terms of utility, our
adaptive privacy protection strategy dominates any static
strategies employing the same location-privacy protection
techniques with us for any  that render the participatory
sensing application feasible.
4. CONCLUSION
We have dened a simple, yet eective, adaptive location-
privacy protection scheme for participatory sensing and show-
ed its eectiveness against static schemes based on real data
traces. Our approach improves achievable utility, while sat-
isfying the individual privacy requirements of users. As fu-
ture work, we plan to consider the existence of application-
related background information at the AS.
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